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Index: Economics and Finance

Bureaucratic overgrazing and the tragedy of the common currency.

All around us we see examples of cases where common pool resource problems persist, at least until there is a major crisis. Parties disagree, occasionally on the magnitude or nature of the overall problem, but most often, on the sharing of the costs and benefits of addressing it.

‘A reversal of the process of European financial integration.’

Banks and investment funds in one euro-using country gorged on the bonds of others, freed of worry about devaluation-prone currencies like the drachma, lira, peseta and escudo. But as the devaluation danger waned, another risk grew, almost unseen by investors: the chance that governments, no longer backed by national central banks, could default.

The euro-fail: Britain’s close call.

Those who blithely assumed Britain should simply accept whatever France and Germany needed to do in order to save themselves from the collapse of the euro are now, like Nicholas Watt in today’s Guardian, worried that Britain is ‘dangerously isolated’ in Europe. The danger is real, but thanks to Mr Cameron Britain is ‘isolated’ the way those on lifeboats were ‘isolated’ from the Titanic.

A lesson for sophisticated Americans: How to say ‘doomed’ in European.

The punch will come, in other words, not because the collapse of the European banking system will cripple the European economy and thus indirectly hurt our ability to sell things to Europeans. Instead the collapse of the European banking system will directly cripple an American economy that depends on European banks to provide a fair share of our credit.

Occupy’s demands clarified: First, make no demands.

It’s not that there aren’t ideas of how you could resolve this. The problem is there’s hundreds floating around. There’s no possibility of those in power even looking at them or thinking about them, even talking about what the actual, day-to-day dilemmas most Americans face.

• Dominoes worked for Dulles, but the euro crisis obeys the laws of popcorn.

When popcorn is made (the old fashioned way), oil and corn kernels are placed in the bottom of a pan, heat is applied and the kernels pop. Were the first kernel to pop removed from the pan, there would be no noticeable difference. The other kernels would pop anyway because of the heat. The fundamental structural cause is the heat, not the fact that one kernel popped, triggering others to follow.

• The euro-crisis: crying all the way into history’s bank.

“We can’t be the city’s ATM any longer,” said Gabriello Mancini, the Monte dei Paschi Foundation’s chairman, in an interview in his 13th-century headquarters building overlooking Siena’s famous Piazza del Campo.

• ‘Now, the question is how big a default Greece will have.’

By CHARLES FORELLE, COSTAS PARIS and MATINA STEVIS [The Wall Street Journal] – The options being debated now [to save the eurozone] are more severe and far-reaching than those under consideration in months past. Last year, when the crisis first threatened the euro zone’s stability, leaders insisted that Greece would not default and that assistance […]

• The difference between companies that produce products and banks.

By ROGER BERKOWITZ [Hannah Arendt Center] – It is true that not all wealthy Americans were bailed out. It is not an accident that the protesters aren’t picketing at Apple or Microsoft and they are not picketing Alcoa or Johnson & Johnson. I am sure we can complain about the tax strategies, outsourcing, and off-shore […]

• The euro-crisis: killing the bakers doesn’t lower the price of bread.

When the price of bread rose in their revolution, the French took bakers to the guillotine. They got more inflation, and less bread. When their descendants saw bond prices falling, they passed restrictions on short sales. They got lower prices, and less liquidity.

• George Soros, bubble science, and the lunacy of the $2000 ounce.

By ALEX PRESTON [New Statesman] – There is a science to investing in bubbles. George Soros has built a career and an extraordinary fortune on the back of his “theory of reflexivity”, which identifies bubbles before they inflate and which, crucially, tells him when to get out. As early as the Davos conference in January […]

• Regulating mad dogs and English bankers.

If this were just another Dangerous Dogs Act, it wouldn’t much matter. Over-reacting to a crisis is part of the stuff in trade of modern politics. But banking is a lifeblood industry for the UK, and to adopt policies that will make the sector smaller and less profitable at a time when there is no high growth alternative self-evidently coming up in the wings to save the British economy seems almost wilfully self-destructive.

• Italian politicians fizzle while Brussels burns.

Italy’s dream of euro-zone bonds is likely to remain a fantasy until trust between member states is restored. This no longer depends simply on implementing austerity budgets. Structural reforms have now taken center stage because they are a test of whether the euro zone is worth saving at all.

• Nafta magic: making whole towns disappear.

The crucial difference between Mexicali (just south of the border from Calexico, California, on the Baja peninsula) and Fostoria was the wage scale: in Fostoria, unionised production workers made an average $22 an hour, including benefits, for a 40-hour week; in Mexicali, workers on the first two shifts made 15.5 pesos (about $1.83) an hour for a 48-hour week.

• Keynes, Hayek, the LSE, and manufacturing.

Nick O’Hear: Engineers can easily grasp the principles of accounting and finance. The reverse is not true. Bankers can’t do Fourier Analysis, don’t understand electro-magnetism, haven’t heard of a McLaren Series and don’t look forward to a bit of calculus.